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The SLAPP from a Sociological
Perspective*
Penelope Canan, Ph.D.**
I.
Against Public Participation
Strategic
Lawsuits
(SLAPPs) involve the use of litigation to derail political
claims, moving a public debate from the political arena to the
judicial arena, where the playing field appears more advantageous.1 Because the courts are being used in reaction to efforts
to influence governance, the lawsuits violate the Constitutional safeguard of political speech that is guaranteed in the
petition clause of the first amendment.2
* This address was presented during "Strategic

Lawsuits

Against Public

Participation (SLAPPs) - Protecting Property or Intimidating Citizens," the Fall
Colloquium of the Pace University School of Law's Center for Environmental Legal
Studies, co-sponsored by the Environmental Law Committee of the Westchester
County Bar Association, White Plains, New York, October 14, 1989.
This research was sponsored by the National Science Foundation, Law and
Social Science Program under Grant No. SES-8714495. The author thanks George W.
Pring, Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law, Nicholas A. Robinson,
Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, and Reid T. Reynolds, Colorado
State Demographer, for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
Copyright 0 1990 by George W. Pring and Penelope Canan. All rights reserved. This
and the article by Professor Pring are adapted from the authors' forthcoming book,
tentatively entitled, GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT.
** Penelope Canan is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of
Denver where she received her M.A. (1972) and Ph.D. (1976). She is the co-principal
investigator of the Political Litigation Project, sponsored by the National Science
Foundation. Her work, combining the sociology of law, community and politics, has
been published in the LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, SOCIAL
PROBLEMS,

and

SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY.

Her applied sociological research regarding the

social impacts of proposed industrial projects - from utility rate hikes to geothermal
development to rapid transit systems - has been commissioned by private industry
and governments across the nation.
1. See P. Canan and G. W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 Soc. PROBS. 506 (1988).
2. The petition clause guarantees "the right of the people ... to petition the
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As the social scientist of a five-year collaboration, I want
to talk today about our research effort to understand SLAPPs
from a socio-legal perspective. In other words, I will be taking
a non-legal viewpoint to ask: What do we know about
SLAPPs using insights from economics, political science, psychology, anthropology, and my own discipline, sociology?
These interdisciplinary perspectives have produced three
kinds of knowledge about SLAPPs.3
First, we have a good impression of the larger landscape
of these disputes and a quantifiable picture of their patterns.
Second, we have been able to learn about the heart and soul,
the blood and guts, the greed and glory, the panic and the
terror, the justifications and the celebrations, as well as the
ramifications, of SLAPPs on people's lives. And, third, we
have been able to use SLAPPs to add to our understanding of
the relationship between law and the political vitality of
American communities.
SLAPPs are not events, rather they comprise a political
legal phenomenon. This means that we must treat each
SLAPP as a window on a much larger process. So each
SLAPP is not just the story of a legal dispute between opposing hostile parties. Rather, each SLAPP is a window on the
relationship between democratic structures and judicial rules.
It is a window on the link between political tolerance and economic dominance, and a window on the tension between constitutionalism and capitalism.
To date, we have studied 228 SLAPPs using various approaches. We always began with summarizing the information
found in legal documents, public records, newspaper clippings,
and personal papers. We might call this the "peeking over the
windowsill approach" that has produced the quantitative data
I will present. We have also been able to put our whole heads
inside the window and really look around in twelve disputes.
In these twelve instances, we conducted in-depth case studies,
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See Canan & Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 385
(1985).
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where over 100 participants were personally interviewed for
periods lasting between one and five hours. We had verbatim
transcripts made of these interviews; we had them coded for
content;' and we have analyzed them to produce both the
qualitative information that I will present here, as well as a
model of SLAPP disputes that we will be testing this winter.
II.
Quantitatively speaking, having looked over the windowsill in 228 examples of SLAPPs, we know that 1,873 parties
(1,464 individuals and 409 groups) spoke out to a government
agency or official, usually in the executive branch, and usually
at the local level. These individuals and groups either provided information that challenged the viability of a proposed
new economic venture, one that needed a governmental license or public permit, or they commented on the performance of a public servant.
The parties who found fault with the proposed ventures
did so on the basis of one of four claims:
(1) environmental concerns (e.g. threats to wilderness, natural areas, or endangered species);
(2) neighborhood concerns as part of a "not in my
backyard stance" in siting controversies over
dumps, toxic waste disposals, mines, quarries,
half-way houses for the mentally disturbed, restaurants, or bars;
(3) as disgruntled consumers or tenants; or
(4) as opponents of urban or suburban development.
In the public servant cases, the government contact involved
criticism of police officers, public school teachers, city council
members, or other government officials who turned out not to
appreciate citizens
having an opinion about their
performance.
4. See J. Seidel, The Ethnograph:A Programfor the Computer Assisted Analysis of Text Based Data (1988) (Qualis Research Associates, Littleton, Colo.).
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The 1,873 parties who spoke out were sued, usually for
defamation, for an average of $9,000,000 by 654 other parties
(423 individuals and 231 groups) whose self-declared primary
interest was economic, occupational, or industrial. Typical
SLAPP filers were real estate developers, property owners,
police officers, alleged polluters, business owners, and state or
local government agencies.
Most defendants of the SLAPPs prevailed after an average of thirty-six months and the involvement of a number of
court levels. Legal factors like type of claims, number of
claims, amount and type of relief requested, duration, or number of appeals seemed to have no bearing on the legal outcomes of these cases. However, the chances of a defendant
winning a SLAPP suit substantially improved (from 67% to
82%) if the petition clause had been raised as a defense.
III.
Parnas Corp. v. Pierce Canyon Homeowner's Ass'n,5 a
SLAPP filed in 1980 in Saratoga, California, make these numbers come alive. I would like to tell you about this case.
Saratoga, on the fringe of San Jose, was squarely part of
the American boomtown experience know as the Silicon Valley. Between 1960 and 1970, the population of Saratoga almost doubled, and the population of the county of Santa
Clara increased by one-half. During the next decade, Saratoga's population increased by another 10% and the county's
population increased by 30%. By 1980, the population of Saratoga was 30,000, and the population of Santa Clara County
was about 1.3 million people. Population growth, land speculation, and associated land values skyrocketed as apricot
orchards were bulldozed for the new harvest of silicon chips
and microprocessors, riding the cutting edge of high
7
technology.
5. Parnas Corp. v. Pierce Canyon Homeowners Ass'n, No. 450512 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Santa Clara County filed May 19, 1990).
6. POPULATION STATISTICS FROM U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CURRENT POPULATION REP., Series P1, table 2, table 4 (1970, 1980).
7. See MS. MALONE, THE BIG SCORE, THE BILLION-DOLLAR STORY OF SILICON
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In 1980, many citizens felt that a "pro-development, maximum density philosophy" was threatening the quality of life
in Saratoga." The citizens bemoaned changes in their community's rural character, its public safety, scenic beauty, excessive traffic, and excessive public costs. They maintained that
these changes amounted to a community decline and were associated with a maximum development stance. Disgruntled by
a "loss of faith in the local government's ability to responsibly
withstand development pressures," citizens groups in Saratoga proposed a ballot vote on something they called "Measure A." 9
Measure A called for an initial one-year moratorium on
land development on the Saratoga hillside. During this year,
the citizens wanted environmentally-informed land use standards designed and put in place. From then on, the city would
thus be required to monitor and to limit the density on
development.
Land developers opposed Measure A. Kamingar Parnas
was a land speculator who was directly affected because Measure A would apply to a parcel for which he had already obtained development permits. He was apprehensive because exceptions to the Measure's application on existing permits had
to be approved by a four-out-of-five vote of the City Council.
In addition, three seats on the Council were up for grabs in
the same election.
One of the citizens groups that backed Measure A was the
West Valley Taxpayers and Environmentalists Association
(WVTEA) headed by Victor Monia. Monia was a self-made
executive in the product packaging field. Monia, like many of
his neighbors, was new to the area, was ready to put down
roots, and euphoric about finding the good life on "the way to
San Jose." The WVTEA began as a tiny ad hoc group, formed
to keep a local college from building a football stadium in
VALLEY (1985).

8. THE BALLOT STATEMENT: ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF MEASURE A (Saratoga, Cal.,
Jan. 18, 1980). On file with the City Attorney, City of Saratoga.
9. CITIZENS' ADVISORY COMMITTEE, STATEMENT OF MEASURE A (Apr. 4, 1980). On
file with the Saratoga City Hall.
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their neighborhood. Under Monia's leadership, it developed
into a viable, grassroots political organization having 500 families as members.
Victor Monia agreed to write the pro-Measure A ballot
statement. Monia's statement, along with opposing statements, was sent to all homes in the community to inform voters about the ballot issue. Monia also organized door-to-door
campaigns to encourage residents to vote on Measure A. However, neither Monia nor his organization participated in the
production of a pro-Measure A political flyer that urged a proMeasure A vote "to stop developers like Parnas, who was involved in the Mayor of Freemont's conflict of interest case."
As it turned out, a man named Rhodes, who was the former Mayor of Freemont, a nearby town, had left office "prematurely." After an investigation by the FBI of his land deals
and related conflicts of interest,"0 he paid the highest penalty
ever assessed under the state's political reform act (California
Fair Political Practices Act)." Mayor Rhodes and Kamingar
Parnas had been involved in many land deals, some of which
were enhanced by the mayor's failure to remove himself from
voting situations in which he had a personal financial interest.
Although anti-Measure A forces outspent pro-Measure A
forces eight to one, Measure A passed. The city council was
subsequently transformed. The three council seats that were
up for election were won by pro-Measure A candidates. This
outcome occurred in an election that the local newspaper observed was seen not as a personality contest, but as an election decided on the issues. The election was a mandate from
the people that the local government take responsibility for
monitoring development.
One month later, Parnas Corporation sued three homeowners groups and their presidents for defamation which it
alleged was contained in the political flyer. Monia and
WVTEA had been SLAPPed. Parnas asked for $40,150,000 in
10. See Wilson, Ex-Freemont Mayor Rhodes to Pay $75,000 Penalty in Disclosure Case, San Jose Mercury News, May 10, 1980.
11. CAL. GOVERNMENT CODE § 83100 (West 1990).
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damages.1" The pursuit of the lawsuit was very telling. Parnas
deposed newly-elected pro-Measure A city council members,
who saw the deposition process as a threat that they, too,
might be sued. Significantly, Parnas failed to drop Monia and
WVTEA from the suit when it was learned that they were not
involved with the flyer. Once the corporation received suitable
density variances, it lost interest in pursuing the case. Two
years later, the lawsuit was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
But the damage was done.
Over those two years, all three homeowners groups fell
apart. People withdrew from the organizations, afraid that
they would be swept under $40,150,000 worth of liability. The
groups' presidents and their families were traumatized personally, financially, and psychologically.
Victor Monia found that the trauma of a $40 million lawsuit also had career consequences. The lawsuit distracted him
from the pressing demands of his company and resulted in
reduced productivity that contributed to his departure from
the company. It undermined his sense of control over his life;
it introduced stress into his marriage; it subverted his leadership position in the community; and it robbed the neighborhood of an energetic leader.
Monia and WVTEA fought back, filing suit against
Parnas in what the popular press called a "SLAPP-back. ' '"3
He won $260,000, most of which were punitive damages. He
fought back alone, however, as no one would join him in the
suit. The other leaders and Monia's neighbors had all learned
that there is a high price for speaking out.
IV.
The Parnas SLAPP illustrates the motivating
many SLAPPs. It can also teach us about the
SLAPPs on political participation, as well as the
acceptable avenues available to developers, like

factors in
impact of
politically
Kamingar

12. Parnas Corp. v. Pierce Canyon Homeowners Ass'n, No. 450512 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Santa Clara County filed May 19, 1980).
13. Monia v. Parnas Corp., No. 541313 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County filed
Dec. 12, 1984).
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Parnas, who may be frustrated by citizen opposition.
Having studied 228 cases, we have found that there may
be any one of four general motivations for filing SLAPPs, all
of which were present in the Parnas SLAPP. These motives
are:
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

the intent to retaliate for successful opposition
on an issue of public interest;
the attempt to prevent expected future, competent opposition on subsequent public policy
issues;
the intent to intimidate and, generally, to send
a message that opposition will be punished;
and
a view of litigation and the use of the court
system as simply another tool in a strategy to
win a political and/or economic battle.

Individually or cumulatively, these motives provide evidence that the SLAPP filer has a total disregard for the citizenship rights of others and a lack of concern over what reduced political debate means for American democracy.
The effects of SLAPPs on political participation are farreaching. In the Parnas case, over 500 families within one
neighborhood were chilled from political involvement in the
future. Moreover, this community may suffer a decline in the
quality of the public decisions that are made, since the prevailing viewpoint of maximum development will have a less
formidable countervailing voice.
However, we can never calculate the ripple effects of this
attempt to silence effective public opposition. What about the
impact of this lawsuit on scores of people who have read
newspaper reports about the plight of these citizens? What
about friends and families who have received letters describing their ordeal? What about Boy Scout and Girl Scout leaders who, as a result of these suits, grow up to circumscribe
their wholly enthusiastic invocations to "get involved" with
gusto? Like the pebble thrown in the water, a single SLAPP
can have effects far beyond its initial impact.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss1/12
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What are politically acceptable avenues available to developers like Parnas? Can we all understand being frustrated
by citizen opposition and wanting to protect one's property
interests? Yes, we can. We believe that Kamingar Parnas
shares every right afforded to all Americans to influence the
governmental context in which development occurs. Certainly,
the empirical evidence points to the overwhelming influence
that land developers have on the rules of the development
game." Indeed, in the specific case of Saratoga, California, a
lopsided degree of influence appears to have been the basis of
the citizen revolt in 1980.
What Parnas does not have a right to do is to punish
other citizens, like Victor Monia, for speaking out about how
they think their government should operate, and how they
think the rules of the development game in their community
ought to be played. Trying to punish one's opponents for trying to influence their government, or in any way silence them
politically, is exactly the behavior that the petition clause
prohibits.
V.
The petition clause is designed to encourage informed political change. It treats all citizens' viewpoints as relevant and
deserving of the same protection. It is also designed to protect
political speech as a safeguard from the intolerance and repression that breeds hatred; for with hatred and fear comes
violent political upheaval. 15 Finally, the petition clause is an
assertion that the government itself governs at the pleasure of
"[w]e, the people,"' 6 and not at the pleasure of those who can
abuse their economic power by filing lawsuits against their citizen opponents.
14. See JR. LOGAN & H.L.MOLOTCH,
OF PLACE

(1987);

URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

J. FORESTER, PLANNING IN THE FACE OF POWER (1989).

15. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ.,
concurring). •
16. Rhodes, We the People and the Struggle for a New World; the Constitution
of the United States of America and InternationalHuman Rights, 30 How. L. J. 997
(1987).
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It is the sovereignty of the individual that the petition
clause is all about; it is this feature of American democracy
that is emulated around the world, whether it be in Tianamen
Square, East Germany, or Poland. Over a century ago, de
Tocqueville praised this remarkable aspect of the United
States' experiment in democracy. He observed:
Whenever the political laws of the United States are
to be discussed, it is with the doctrine of the sovereignty
of the people that we must begin.
The principal of the sovereignty of the people, which
is always to be found, more or less, at the bottom of almost all human institutions, generally remains there concealed from view. It is obeyed without being recognized,
or if for a moment it be brought to light, it is hastily cast
back into the gloom of the sanctuary.
In America, the principle of the sovereignty of the
people is not either barren or concealed, as it is with some
other nations; it is recognized by the customs and proclaimed by the laws; it spreads freely, and arrives without
impediment at its most remote consequences. If there be
a country in the world where the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people can be fairly appreciated, where it
can be studied in its application to the affairs of society,
and where its dangers and its advantages may be judged,
that country is assuredly America. 7
Professor Pring and I hope that our research, and forums
like this one, in which we can present questions, discuss findings, and debate issues, stem the tide of SLAPPs, and in so
doing, reaffirm this country's commitment to governance by
"[w]e, the people."

17. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55-56 (1956).
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